We show that the monotone continuity condition introduced by Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970) is the behavioral counterpart of countable additivity (and relative weak compactness) in a multiple priors model. This generalizes their original result, in which the special case of a singleton set of priors is considered. Further extending their results, we provide a behavioral counterpart for the convex rangedness of the priors (both considered singularly and as a vector measure).
Introduction
Decision theorists have often debated whether to use countably or Þnitely additive probabilities to model decision makers' subjective beliefs. The two most notable advocates of Þnite additivity were de Finetti and Savage, who argued that countable additivity is a purely technical property devoid of a clear behavioral content and whose assumption prevents the analysis of signiÞcant phenomena (see Savage, 1954 , and de Finetti 1931 .
On the other hand, countable additivity is a very convenient property, which leads to many important results in probability theory like, for example, the classic limit laws or Fubini's theorem. As a result, its use is pervasive in mathematical economics and Þnance.
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For a decision theorist the problem is, therefore, to understand whether the added analytic power of countable additivity offsets its supposed shaky behavioral underpinning.
An important contribution to this issue was provided by Arrow (1970) , who identiÞed the precise behavioral conditions under which subjective beliefs can be represented by a countably additive probability. In particular, by building on Villegas (1964) , Arrow (1970) obtained a subjective expected utility representation with a countably additive probability by adding the following monotone continuity axiom to a set of standard Savage-type axioms.
Axiom 1 (Monotone Continuity) Given any acts f Â g in L, consequence x in X, and sequence of events {E n } n≥1 in Σ with E 1 ⊇ E 2 ⊇ ... and T n≥1 E n = ∅, there existsn ≥ 1 such that "
With his result, Arrow (1970) showed that monotone continuity is the behavioral condition which underlies the use of countably additive probabilities in subjective expected utility theory. The question is, therefore, whether or not a most useful condition like monotone continuity is also a sensible behavioral property. It is not, however, our purpose to expatiate on this, ultimately subjective, issue. 1 In contrast, our aim in this paper is to study the implications of monotone continuity for the multiple priors model, a popular generalization of subjective expected utility theory. In this model the decision makers' beliefs are represented by a set C of priors in order to capture the vagueness of beliefs (also called ambiguity), and acts are ranked according to the minimum expected utilities with respect to C (see Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) or, more generally, according to a weighted average of the minimum and the maximum expected utilities with respect to C. Conventional subjective expected utility theory is the special case in which the set of priors C is a singleton, modelling in this way a situation where there is no vagueness.
Not surprisingly, countable additivity turns out to be a very convenient property in applications of the multiple priors model. For example, the recent applications in economics and Þnance of Epstein and Wang (1994) and (1995), Chen and Epstein (1998), Billot, Chateauneuf, Gilboa, and Tallon (2000), and Delbaen (2000) critically depend on the countable additivity of the probabilities forming the decision makers' set of priors, and on some compactness properties of such a set.
It is natural to wonder whether such a convenient property has its behavioral counterpart in the monotone continuity of preferences. In this paper we show that, fortunately, this is indeed the case. In particular, a preference relation having a multiple priors representation is monotone continuous if and only if the set of priors is a relatively weak compact subset of countably additive probabilities. This is shown in Section 3.
We recall that the subjective probability obtained with the Savage axioms is convex ranged, that is -under the monotone continuity assumption -non-atomic. Convex rangedness of the elements of C is an assumption of growing importance in the study of ambiguity (see Nehring, 2001 , and Amarante, 2002, and 2003 for some applications). In Section 4, we extend another classic result of Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970) by showing that a simple atomlessness property of preferences is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non-atomicity of all the priors in C, while a more demanding atomlessness property is needed to obtain the convex-rangedness of the whole set C as a vector measure.
Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Set-up
Mathematical preliminaries
Throughout the paper, Σ is a σ-algebra of subsets of a space S. Subsets of S are understood to be in Σ even where not stated explicitly. We denote by ba (S, Σ) and ca (S, Σ), respectively, the vector spaces of Þnitely additive and countably additive real-valued set functions on Σ having Þnite variation norm; we call charges the elements of ba (S, Σ) and measures the elements of ca (S, Σ). Clearly, ca (S, Σ) is a vector subspace of the vector space ba (S, Σ). In particular, both ca (S, Σ) and ba (S, Σ) become Banach spaces when equipped with the variation norm k·k v . An element µ of ca (S, Σ) is non-atomic if, for all A ∈ Σ with µ (A) 6 = 0, there exists B ∈ Σ such that B ⊆ A and µ (A) 6 = µ (B) 6 = 0; non-atomic elements of ca (S, Σ) form a closed subspace of ca (S, Σ) denoted by nca (S, Σ) (see, e.g., Aumann and Shapley 1974 p. 28) .
We denote by B (S, Σ) the set of all functions ϕ : S → R which are bounded and measurable with respect to Σ. The vector space B (S, Σ) is a Banach space with respect to the supnorm k·k s . Moreover, its norm dual is isometrically isomorphic to (ba (S, Σ) , k·k v ). This endows ba (S, Σ) and its subsets of a weak * topology too. 2 Finally, ba 1 (S, Σ) and ca 1 (S, Σ) denote, respectively, the sets of probabilities in ba (S, Σ) and ca (S, Σ); we reserve the letter P for elements of ba 1 (S, Σ) and ca 1 (S, Σ).
2 Given a subset M of ba (S, Σ), the weak * topology is the weakest topology for which all functionals µ 7 → R ϕdµ are continuous, where ϕ ∈ B (S, Σ) and µ ∈ M . 
Decision-theoretic preliminaries
States of nature and events are represented by the pair (S, Σ), while X is the space of consequences. An act is a map f : S → X and it is simple when it is Þnite valued; L 0 denotes the set of all simple Σ-measurable acts. The decision maker has a preference relation % on L 0 , which in turn induces a preference over X, obtained in the standard way by identifying consequences with constant acts. A binary relation % on L 0 is an α-maximin expected utility (α-MEU) preference relation if there exists a utility index u : X → R, a non-empty set C ⊆ ba 1 (S, Σ) and a constant
for all f ∈ L 0 . Clearly, if C = {P } is a singleton, α-MEU preferences collapse to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU):
We assume that the range u (X) of u is not a nowhere dense subset of R, that is, the interior of the closure u (X) is non-empty. Clearly, this is the case when u (X) is an interval of R; for instance when X is a convex set and u is nonconstant and affine, or when X is a connected topological space and u is nonconstant and continuous. It is easy to see that this assumption implies that X has to be at least countably inÞnite. Notice that, given any set of priors C ⊆ ba 1 (S, Σ), we have
for this reason the set C itself is often assumed to be convex and weak * closed.
Axiomatic characterizations of this kind of preferences for α = 1 (MEU) can be found in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) , Casadesus-Masanell, Klibanoff, and Ozdenoren (2000) , and Ghirardato, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Siniscalchi (2001) , while the general case of α ∈ [0, 1] is considered in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and and Kopylov (2002) .
Let L be the set of all acts f : S → X that are both preference measurable, i.e., {s ∈ S : f (s) % x} and {s ∈ S : f (s) Â x} belong to Σ for all x in X, and preference bounded, i.e., there exist x and x in X such that x % f (s) % x for all s ∈ S. Since for all f ∈ L we have u • f ∈ B (S, Σ) (see Lemma 7 in the Appendix) the natural extension of the functional V deÞned by Eq. (1) from L 0 to L allows to extend % from L 0 to L too; the extensions of V and % to L will still be denoted by V and %.
Monotone Continuity
We can now state our main result, which shows that even in the generalized setting of α-MEU preferences, monotone continuity is the behavioral property underlying countable additivity.
Theorem 1 Let % be an α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % is monotone continuous.
(ii) C is a relatively weak compact subset of ca (S, Σ).
This theorem generalizes the aforementioned results of Arrow and Villegas, who dealt with singleton sets of priors. It is also related to some other results in the literature. Schmeidler (1972) p. 220 noticed that the core of a continuous exact game is a weak sequentially compact subset of ca 1 (S, Σ), while Epstein and Wang (1995) p. 44 showed that the set of priors is a weak sequentially compact subset of ca (S, Σ) when the MEU functional min P ∈C R u (f ) dP is continuous at certainty. Finally, showed that C is included in ca (S, Σ) whenever % is monotone continuous.
Some more behavioral conditions equivalent to (i) can be found in Theorem 11 in the Appendix, while the Eberlein-Smulian Theorem (see, e.g. Megginson, 1998 p. 248), Theorems IV.9.1 and IV.9.2 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958), and Lemmas 5 and 6 in the Appendix, provide a wide range of topological conditions equivalent to (ii).
Range Convexity
By using bets, the preference % on L induces in a well-known way a likelihood ordering % l on the event σ-algebra Σ, that takes the form A % l B if and only if
Villegas (1964) and Arrow (1970) proved that for a standard monotone continuous SEU ordering %, the single probability P that represents % l is non-atomic if and only if % l satisÞes the following condition.
In the standard SEU case, in which C is a singleton, downward atomlessness is equivalent to:
For α ∈ (0, 1), downward and upward atomlessness always coincide; for α ∈ {0, 1}, some further conditions are needed, as discussed in Lemma 13 in the Appendix. The next result shows that downward atomlessness is the appropriate non-atomicity requirement for 0-MEU preferences, upward atomlessness is the appropriate one for 1-MEU preferences, and any one of the two works for α-MEU preferences when α ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 2 Let % be a monotone continuous α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors. If α 6 = 1 (α 6 = 0, resp.), the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) % is downward atomless (upward, resp.),
(ii) all priors P in C are non-atomic.
As well-known, a probability measure P is non-atomic if and only if it is convex-ranged, that is, if for each A ∈ Σ and each α ∈ [0, 1], there exists B ⊆ A such that P (B) = αP (A). In other words, P is non-atomic if and only if the set {P (B) : B ⊆ A and B ∈ Σ } is convex and compact in R for all A ∈ Σ.
Given a set C of probability measures, a natural extension of this property is to require that for each A ∈ Σ the set
is convex and weak compact in the space B (C) of all real-valued bounded functions on C, which is a Banach space under the supnorm. In this case, we say that C is uniformly convex-ranged. In particular, this implies that for each A ∈ Σ and each α ∈ [0, 1], there exists B ⊆ A such that P (B) = αP (A) for all P ∈ C.
The next result provides a behavioral characterization of the uniform range convexity of the set of priors C of an α-MEU preference. A property which, for example, plays a key role in Nehring (2001) .
To state the result we have to introduce few notions. An act f ∈ L is unambiguous given
for all P, Q ∈ C such that P (A) and Q (A) are nonzero. Intuitively, an act is unambiguous given A if its evaluation is not affected by the perceived ambiguity when beliefs are updated, one by one, according to Bayes rule given that event A obtained.
an act f : S → X is essentially downward (upward, resp.) constant on A if there exists a downward (upward, resp.) null subset N of A and a consequence x ∈ X such that f (s) ∼ x for all s ∈ A − N . We are now ready to state the promised characterization.
Theorem 3 Let % be a monotone continuous α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors, and suppose u (X) is an interval. If α 6 = 1 (α 6 = 0, resp.), the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) The set C is uniformly convex-ranged;
(ii) For all non downward (upward, resp.) null events E ∈ Σ, there exists an act f ∈ L -non essentially downward (upward, resp.) constant on E -which is unambiguous given E.
In reading condition (ii), it is important to observe that essentially constant acts are unambiguous given any event E. Hence, it is key in (ii) to require the act not to be essentially constant. Another fundamental result on weak compactness is the Eberlein-Smulian theorem, which guarantees that, for a subset K of a normed space, weak compactness, weak sequential compactness, and weak limit point compactness, as well as relative weak compactness, relative weak sequential compactness, and relative weak limit point compactness coincide (see e.g. Megginson 1998 p. 248-249).
A Proofs and Related Material
A caveat: Dunford and Schwartz (1958) call weak sequentially compact a subset K of a Banach space B such that every sequence µ n in K contains a subsequence which weak converges to an element of B (not necessarily belonging to K); we will call it relatively weak sequentially compact, and reserve the term weak sequentially compact to subsets K of B such that every sequence µ n in K contains a subsequence which weak converges to an element of K.
The following result shows a surprising relation existing between compactness in the weak and weak * topologies. It is essentially due to Bartle, Dunford and Schwartz (1955) (cf.
Weber, 1986, and Maccheroni and Marinacci 2001).
Lemma 5 Let C be a subset of ca (S, Σ). Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) C is weak * closed and relatively weak compact.
(ii) C is weak * closed and norm bounded.
(iii) C is weak * compact.
(iv) C is weak * sequentially compact.
(v) C is weak * limit point compact.
(vi) C is weak compact.
Moreover, if C ⊆ ca 1 (S, Σ) is convex and (vi) holds, then there exists P 0 ∈ C such that for all P ∈ C we have P (A) = 0 whenever P 0 (A) = 0.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (vi) Relative weak sequential compactness guarantees that if µ n is a sequence in C, there exists a subsequence µ n j of µ n weak converging to a charge µ ∈ ba (S, Σ), but then µ n weak * converges to µ and µ ∈ C so that C is weak sequentially compact that is weak compact.
(iii) ⇔ (ii) This is the Alaoglu Theorem.
(iv) ⇔ (vi) Assume C is weak * sequentially compact. Let µ n be a sequence in C, there exists a subsequence µ n j of µ n weak * converging to a measure µ ∈ C, then, for all A ∈ Σ,
and hence µ n j is bounded (by Lemma 4) and it weak converges to µ (see, e.g., Dunford and Schwartz (1958) Theorem IV.9.5 p. 308). Therefore C is weak sequentially compact, and hence it is weak compact. The converse is trivial.
(v) ⇔ (vi) Assume C is weak * limit point compact. Let M = {µ n } n≥1 be a countably inÞnite subset of C, and µ ∈ C be a weak * limit point for M . For any ε > 0, and
8 Let λ ∈ ca (S, Σ) be such that µ n , µ are absolutely continuous with respect to λ for all
for all A ∈ Σ where µ 0 = µ). Let ca (S, Σ, λ) be the subspace consisting of all λ-absolutely continuous elements of ca (S, Σ). Consider the isometric isomorphism
and let θ n = dµ n dλ and θ = dµ dλ . For any ε > 0, and ψ 1 , ψ 2 , ..., ψ q ∈ L ∞ (S, Σ, λ), choose ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ..., ϕ q ∈ B (S, Σ) such that ϕ j = ψ j λ-almost everywhere, and N ∈ N such that µ N satisÞes Eq. (4), θ N 6 = θ and
But L ∞ (S, Σ, λ) is isometric and isomorphic to the dual of L 1 (S, Σ, λ), and so θ is a weak limit point for {θ n } n≥1 in L 1 (S, Σ, λ). Since a linear operator between normed spaces is norm continuous if, and only if, it is weak continuous, and
is a norm-to-norm linear isomorphism, we have that
is a weak-to-weak linear homeomorphism. Hence, µ is a weak limit point for {µ n } n≥1 ⊆ ca (S, Σ, λ). Finally, the weak topology on ca (S, Σ, λ) coincides with that inherited from the weak topology of ca (S, Σ), which, in its turn, coincides with that inherited from the weak topology of ba (S, Σ), and so µ is a weak limit point for {µ n } n≥1 ⊆ ba (S, Σ). Therefore C is weak limit point compact. Again the converse is trivial.
Since, (vi) imply (iii) and (iii) implies (v), we can conclude that (ii)-(vi) are equivalent. Moreover, (vi) implies relative sequential weak compactness and (ii) implies weak * closure, whence (i). Finally, if C ⊆ ca 1 (S, Σ) is convex, as suggested by Delbaen (1974) p. 226, replace 1/2 i by 1/m n at the bottom of p. 307 of Dunford and Schwartz (1958) . In this way their proof provides the existence of a countable sequence {P i } i∈I ⊆ C and {α i } i∈I ⊆ R + such that all probabilities P ∈ C are absolutely continuous with respect to P 0 = P i∈I α i P i , where α i > 0 for all i ∈ I and P i∈I α i = 1. Then, P 0 ∈ C, since C, being bounded, weak * closed and convex is bounded, norm closed, and convex. 4 Another useful Lemma 6 Let C be a subset of ca (S, Σ). The following facts are equivalent:
and it is countably additive in (B (C) , k·k s ). 4 If B is a Banach space C ⊆ B is closed and convex, {c n } is a bounded sequence in C, (β n ) n∈N ⊆ R + , and P ∞ n=1 β n = 1, then P ∞ n=1 β n c n converges to a c ∈ C.
(ii) C is bounded and sup µ∈C |µ (A n )| → 0 whenever A n ↓ ∅.
(iii) C is relatively weak compact.
Proof. (i) ⇔ (ii)
Clearly Γ is an additive set function. By Lemma 4, C is bounded iff {µ (A)} µ∈C is bounded for all A ∈ Σ iff Γ : Σ → R C takes values in the set B (C) of bounded functions on C. Moreover, sup µ∈C |µ (A n )| → 0 whenever A n ↓ ∅ amounts to saying that
The standard argument for scalar set functions shows that an additive set map Γ : Σ → B (C) is countably additive iff Γ (A n ) k·k s → 0 whenever A n ↓ ∅.
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(ii) ⇔ (iii). This is just a restatement of Theorem IV.9.1 in Dunford and Schwartz (1958).
A.2 Monotone Continuity
We start Þxing a measurability issue.
Proof. There exist x and x in X such that x % f (s) % x for all s ∈ S, i.e. u (x) % u (f (s)) % u (x), then u • f is bounded. Let a ∈ R and consider the set {s ∈ S : u (f (s)) > a}, we want to show that it belongs to Σ.
• If a ∈ u (X) -say a = u (x) -then
• Else a / ∈ u (X). Without loss of generality, there exists t ∈ S such that u (f (t)) > a (otherwise {s ∈ S : u (f (s)) > a} = ∅ ∈ Σ). Let b = inf {u (f (t)) : t ∈ S and u (f (t)) > a}. There exists a sequence {t k } in S such that u (f (t k )) > a and u (f (t k )) ↓ b. In particular b ≥ a.
n ↑ S, set B 0 = ∅ and E n = B n − B n−1 for all n ∈ N. Clearly S = F ∞ 1 E n and B n = F n 1 E j , by countable additivity,
-Else, for all t ∈ S with u (f (t)) > a we have u (f (t)) > b. Then
As wanted.
Instead of directly proving Theorem 1, we will prove a slightly more general result: Theorem 11. Which also has the advantage of a very straight dimostration technique.
If f, g ∈ L and A ∈ Σ, we set
DeÞnition 8 A binary relation % on L is:
• Strongly monotone continuous (s.m.c.) if for all acts e, f, g ∈ L with f Â g, and all sequences of events {E n } n≥1 ⊆ Σ with E n ↓ ∅, there existsn ∈ N such that: eEnf Â g and f Â eEng.
• weakly left monotone continuous (w.l.m.c.) if for all x, y, z ∈ X with y Â z, and all sequences of events {E n } n≥1 ⊆ Σ with E n ↓ ∅, there existsn ∈ N such that: xEny Â z.
• weakly right monotone continuous (w.r.m.c.) if for all x, y, z ∈ X with y Â z, and all sequences of events {E n } n≥1 ⊆ Σ with E n ↓ ∅, there existsn ∈ N such that: y Â xEnz.
• weakly monotone continuous (w.m.c.) if it is weakly right monotone continuous and weakly left monotone continuous. 
Lemma 9
Let % be an α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors. If α 6 = 1 (α 6 = 0, resp.) and % is weakly right (left, resp.) monotone continuous, then C is a relatively weak compact subset of ca (S, Σ).
Proof. Let be α 6 = 1 and % be weakly right monotone continuous. Let E n ↓ ∅ and let y, z ∈ X be such that y Â z and there exists a sequence {z k } k≥1 of consequences such that z k Â z k+1 Â z for all k ≥ 1, and lim k→∞ u (z k ) = u (z). W.l.o.g., set u (y) = 1 and u(z) = 0. By weak right monotone continuity, for all k ∈ N there existsn ∈ N such that yEnz ≺ z k . That is, α inf P ∈C P (En) + (1 − α) sup P ∈C P (En) < u (z k ), but the sequence
Passing to the limit for k → ∞:
we can conclude
Hence, for all E n ↓ ∅ and all
Eq. (5) yields relative weak compactness by Lemma 6. Let be α 6 = 0 and % be weakly left monotone continuous. Let Σ 3 E n ↑ S (i.e. E c n ↓ ∅), and let y, z ∈ X be such that y Â z and there exists a sequence {y k } k≥1 of consequences such that y k ≺ y k+1 ≺ y for all k ≥ 1, and lim k→∞ u (y k ) = u (y). Without loss of generality, set u (y) = 1 and u(z) = 0. By weak left monotone continuity, for all k ∈ N there existsn ∈ N such that zE
we can conclude lim n→∞ inf P ∈C P (E n ) = 1. And hence for all increasing sequences of events {E n } n≥1 ⊆ Σ with E n ↑ S, and all Q ∈ C, inf
Finally, lim n→∞ inf P ∈C P (E n ) = 1 for all E n ↑ S, is equivalent to sup P ∈C P (A n ) → 0 for all A n ↓ 0, which yields relative weak compactness by Lemma 6.
Lemma 10 Let % be an α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors. If C is a relatively weak compact subset of ca (S, Σ), then % is strongly monotone continuous.
Proof. Let e, f, g ∈ L with f Â g, and Σ 3 E n ↓ ∅. For all ε > 0,
Then, by Lemma 6, lim n (sup P ∈C P (A n )) = 0, hence there exists n ε ∈ N such that P (A n ) < ε for all n ≥ n ε and all P ∈ C.
for all n ≥ n ε and all P ∈ C. Then
The previous lemmas yield the following result, which in turn implies Theorem 1:
Theorem 11 Let % be an α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors. Then, the following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) % is weakly monotone continuous.
(iii) C is a relatively weak compact subset of ca (S, Σ).
(iv) % is strongly monotone continuous.
The next proposition -which imediately follows from Lemmas 9, 10, and Theorem 11 -illustrates the relations existing between weak left and right monotone continuity.
Proposition 12
Let % be an α-MEU preference relation on L. Then, (i) If α = 0, % is weakly monotone continuous iff it is weakly right monotone continuous.
(ii) If α ∈ (0, 1), % is weakly right monotone continuous iff it is weakly left monotone continuous.
(iii) If α = 1, % is weakly monotone continuous iff it is weakly left monotone continuous.
A.3 Range Convexity
Proof of Theorem 2. By Lemma 5, there exists P 0 ∈ co w * (C) such that P ¿ P 0 for all P ∈ co w * (C).
Let α 6 = 1 and let % l be downward atomless. We show that P 0 is non-atomic. Suppose, per contra, that A is an atom for P 0 . Then P 0 (A) > 0, A Â l ∅, 6 and for all B ⊆ A, either P 0 (B) = 0 or P 0 (B) = P 0 (A). In the former case, P (B) = 0 for all P ∈ C, so that B ∼ l ∅; in the latter case, P 0 (A − B) = 0, so that P (A) = P (B) for all P ∈ C, and so B ∼ l A.
This is a contradiction, since % l is downward atomless. Therefore, P 0 is non-atomic. As a consequence any P ∈ C is non-atomic since P ¿ P 0 (see, e.g., Marinacci 1999, p. 360). Conversely, let A ∈ Σ be such that A Â l ∅. Then sup P ∈C P (A) > 0, so that P 0 (A) > 0. Since P 0 is non-atomic, there exists a decreasing sequence B B n ⊆ A for all n ∈ N, and P 0 (B n ) = 1 2 n P 0 (A). Thus sup P ∈C P (B n ) ↓ 0, which implies
For n large enough,
Let α 6 = 0, and consider the dual likelihood relation
[0, 1) and notice that % l is upward atomless iff % l is downward atomless, and that
As a result, if % l is upward atomless, then the argument used in the case α 6 = 1, when applied to % l , shows that C consists of non-atomic measures. Conversely, if C consists of non-atomic measures, the argument used in the case α 6 = 1, shows that % l is downward atomless and % l is upward atomless.
Lemma 13 Let % be a monotone continuous α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors.
(a) If α ∈ (0, 1), then % l is downward atomless iff it is upward atomless.
(b) If α ∈ {0, 1}, then, downward and upward atomlessness coincide provided that, for any A ∈ Σ, we have A c ∼ l ∅ if and only if A ∼ l S.
Proof. A direct proof of (a), not building on monotone continuity is available. But under monotone continuity the result imediatly descends from Theorem 2. Next we prove (b). Let α = 1. We Þrst show that downward atomlessness implies upward atomlessness. Let
In turn, this implies 1−P (B)+P (A) = 1 for all P ∈ C, i.e., P (A) = P (B) for all P ∈ C. Hence, P (A c ) = P (B c ) for all P ∈ C, and so inf P ∈C P (A c ) = inf P ∈C P (B c ), a contradiction.
As to the other implication, let inf
, proceed exactely as above (exchanging the roles of B and A) to obtain a contradiction.
2. % l is upward atomless iff % l is downward atomless.
3. % l is downward atomless iff % l is upward atomless. Hence, the argument used in the case α = 1, when applied to % l , shows that % l is downward atomless iff % l is upward atomless at S, and the same is true for % l .
Lemma 14 Let % be a monotone continuous α-MEU preference relation on L, with a set C of priors, and P 0 ∈ co w * (C) be such that P ¿ P 0 for all P ∈ co w * (C). If α 6 = 1 (α 6 = 0, resp.), then E ∈ Σ is downward (upward, resp.) null iff P 0 (E) = 0, while f ∈ L is downward (upward, resp.) essentially constant on E iff u • f is P 0 -a.s. constant on E.
Proof. Assume α 6 = 1; we have E ∼ l ∅ ⇐⇒ α inf P ∈C P (E) + (1 − α) sup P ∈C P (E) = 0 ⇐⇒ 0 = sup P ∈C P (E) = max P ∈co w * (C)
P (E) ⇐⇒ P 0 (E) = 0.
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Next assume α 6 = 0. Then
P (E c ) = min P ∈co w * (C)
P (E c )
⇐⇒ P (E c ) = 1 for all P ∈ co w * (C) ⇐⇒ P (E) = 0 for all P ∈ co w * (C) ⇐⇒ P 0 (E) = 0.
If α 6 = 1 (α 6 = 0, resp.), f : S → X is downward (upward, resp.) essentially constant on E if there exist a downward (upward, resp.) null subset N of E and a consequence x ∈ X such that f (s) ∼ x for all s ∈ E − N. This happens if and only if there exist a subset N of E such that P 0 (N) = 0 and a consequence x ∈ X such that u (f (s)) = u (x) for all s ∈ E − N , which in turn is equivalent to the existence of a subset N of E such that P 0 (N ) = 0 and u • f is constant on E − N.
Proof of Theorem 3. We write ϕ (S) b u (X) if there exists a compact interval H such that ϕ (S) ⊆ H ⊆ u (X). It is easy to check that {u • f : f ∈ L} = {ϕ ∈ B (S, Σ) : ϕ (S) b u (X)}.
Let P 0 ∈ C be such that P ¿ P 0 for all P ∈ co w * (C). Notice that for a function ψ in L ∞ (P 0 ) the following facts are equivalent:
R E ψdP = k for all P ∈ C such that P (E) 6 = 0.
• R S (ψ1 E + k1 E c ) dP = k for all P ∈ C.
In view of the previous observations, condition (ii) becomes:
(iia) for all E ∈ Σ such that P 0 (E) 6 = 0, there exist f ∈ L and k ∈ R such that (u • f ) |E is non P 0 -a.s. constant on E and 1 P (E) R E u • fdP = k for all P ∈ C such that P (E) 6 = 0.
Setting ϕ = (u • f ) 1 E + k1 E c , (iia) implies:
(iib) for all E ∈ Σ such that P 0 (E) 6 = 0, there exist ϕ in L ∞ (P 0 ) and k ∈ R such that ϕ is a.s. equal to k on E c and non a.s. constant on E such that R S ϕdP = k for all P ∈ C.
Conversely, if (iib) holds, we can take a representative ϕ 0 of ϕ which is bounded, equal to k on E c , and such that ϕ 0 (S) b u (X). 7 Hence, there exists g ∈ L such that u • g = ϕ 0 .
Clearly, g satisÞes (iia), and so (ii), (iia), and (iib) are equivalent. Moreover, (iib) is equivalent to (iic) for all E ∈ Σ such that P 0 (E) > 0, there exists ϕ in L ∞ (P 0 ) which is vanishing off E, non-vanishing on E, and R S ϕdP = 0 for all P ∈ C.
Finally, observe that P 0 (E) = 0 iff P (F ) = 0 for all P ∈ C and all F ∈ Σ ∩ E; that is, Γ (F ) = 0 for all F ∈ Σ ∩ E, where Γ : Σ → B (C) is the vector measure deÞned by Γ (A) = {P (A)} P ∈C . By Knowles Theorem (see Diestel and Uhl, 1977 p. 263), 8 (iic) is then equivalent to (i).
